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Introduction 
 
This article seeks to construct the basis for an answer to the question why, despite the 
evidence of a decline in religious observance throughout Europe and (even) in the 
USA
1
, religion is, perhaps increasingly, a source or a motive or maybe a pretext for 
social conflict and sharp political rhetoric. The question is often answered in terms of 
religious freedom construed as the complete separation of religion and the state, as in 
Hillary Clinton’s astonishing claim, in her Introduction to the US State Department’s 
2011 ‘International Religious Freedom Report’, that ‘Religious freedom provides a 
cornerstone for every healthy society. It empowers faith-based service. It fosters 
tolerance and respect among different communities. And it allows nations that uphold 
it to become more stable, secure and prosperous.’ This notion of separation is more 
difficult than might appear, because the omnipresent heritage of religion in the public 
sphere and cultural and national identity of Western  countries (including Latin 
America) cannot simply be conjured out of existence, and also because of its 
accompanying normative baggage and its indissoluble link to an exemplary projection 
of the United States Constitution and the European Human Rights Convention as 
models. I therefore advocate an approach in terms of regimes of religion-state 
relations, or of religious regulation, with an emphasis on the stability and legitimacy 
of those arrangements, whatever their content. The article will draw on 
transformations in the religious field in Europe, the US and Brazil to challenge and 
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 recombine analytical assumptions about those regimes of regulation in order to lay a 
more realistic and less ethnocentric basis for its comparative study.  
The growing influence of conversion-led movements and the legitimacy of ‘religion 
as belief’ as distinct from ‘religion as heritage’ has major implications for inherited 
arrangements governing regimes of religious regulation. The absence of hierarchical 
institutions able to act as ‘interlocuteurs valables’ authorized to speak on behalf of 
‘religion as a whole’ leads to the near-impossibility of a broad consensual basis for a 
delimitation of the boundaries between religion and the state. At the same time, there 
is something like a lag-effect whereby the followers of new Christian movements and 
of predominantly immigrant-based religions invoke their entitlement to ancient 
exemptions, privileges and recognitions still accorded to hierarchical Christian 
institutions whose support is declining. The underlying once-prevalent and deeply 
Christian cultural assumption that religion is entitled to certain exemptions because it 
is reliant on a hierarchy of virtuosi who make great sacrifices on behalf of the world 
as a whole (Hervieu-Léger, 2001) is lost, yet the corresponding entitlements and 
exemptions are not. What we see instead are new forms of the politicization of 
religion, and the use of religious privilege to claim inherited exemptions and 
entitlements. This means that non-religious interests can take advantage of 
exemptions and privileges reserved for identifiable religious institutions to promote 
agendas such as multiculturalism, anti-racism, or, conversely, cultural and racial 
exclusiveness, in addition to campaigns of moral salvation focused on the politics of 
marriage, reproduction and the body. To these can be added New Age, Yoga, 
alternative physical and psychological therapies which invoke a non-material 
spirituality but do not possess a theology or an ethos for society, let alone institutional 
arrangements for their representation or doctrinal legitimation – adding up to a ‘new-
style’ religion as Linda Woodhead calls it, though one may doubt whether they truly 
qualify for the term.
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As a result of these reflections, the article challenges a fundamental but unarticulated 
assumption of market theorists and others, namely that the more and the more 
intensely religion is practiced, and the more open the religious field, the greater the 
benefits for society as a whole. Following Ernest Gellner and Chris Hann, I provide a 
less dismissive account of the regime of religious recognition and attenuated 
monopoly which emerged in Western Europe, in which certain churches existed for 
 nations as a whole, and thus functioned as open institutions, and a more sceptical 
account of the absolutism of religious freedom policies. Of course, I recognize that 
these national, or hegemonic, churches are not always open to everyone and that their 
hegemony is, to varying degrees, at the expense of minority religions and sometimes 
minority ethnic groups.   
While the point of departure is Europe, the US and Brazil are adduced for comparison 
and conceptual clarification: the US case shows that a radical negation of state 
regulation of religion has led to endless uncertainty and litigation over what counts as 
religious, and maybe sharpened and embittered political conflict. Its legal and 
political framework shifts in accordance with the changing balance of political forces. 
Nowhere do the problems of delimitation arising from ‘religion as belief’ and 
‘conversion-led movements’ appear as sharply as in the US. In Brazil, in contrast, 
which is heir to a long tradition of religious quasi-monopoly so decried by market 
theorists, a veritable revolution, quantitative and qualitative, in the religious practices 
of the population – admittedly, and significantly, without much immigration or 
cultural transplantation such as has occurred in Europe – has occurred with few 
tensions in the political arena and (thus far) with nothing like the ‘culture wars’ 
observed in the US, even though since the 1988 Constitution the regulatory regime is 
similar to the US. 
In conclusion, I claim that contemporary tensions around religion arise because of (a) 
a shift in the nature of religious claims from heritage-based to a basis in personal 
belief; (b) the influence of conversion-led movements and the non-availability of 
impersonal or impartial criteria for the recognition and adjudication of claims for 
religious exemption and privilege; (c) the legacy of exemptions and privileges 
formerly accorded to religious institutions; and (d) the political instrumentalization of 
religion, though this last point awaits development elsewhere.  
 
Heritage and belief 
The legitimacy of religion’s presence in a national public sphere arises, according to 
the ruling climate of opinion and also according to the regime of religious regulation 
in force in Europe, from two sources which are difficult to reconcile: on the one hand 
 there are institutional arrangements for state-religion relations which have been built 
on the assumption that religion is intuitively recognizable due to its character as a 
national heritage or tradition, as a social convention rather than a set of examination 
questions (i.e. doctrine); but on the other hand formal provisions governing religion in 
the public and even the private sphere (such as circumcision, rules about kosher/hallal 
meat and parental prerogatives in their children’s upbringing) are dictated by the 
secular and universalist requirement of non-discrimination and non-favouritism, and 
they assume that religion has an abstract character shared by many religious traditions 
which can be encapsulated in bureaucratic norms and definitions. This second source 
tries hard to distance itself from religion as heritage, but the tension persists, 
complicated by migration and cultural globalization whereby religious practices are 
detached from ancient environments, and heritage is transplanted across political and 
geographical frontiers. 
So while European institutions continue to reflect and express the heritage of religion 
in Europe and while many Europeans (whether or not they consider themselves 
religious) more or less sub-consciously recognize and value that heritage, Europe’s 
multicultural and multi-religious populations are transforming the practical 
institutional impact of those institutions, either because as migrant populations they 
are bringing their traditions with them or, as roaming, globalized seekers for 
supernatural enlightenment, they are transporting ideas about the supernatural and 
about life across the globe into unfamiliar contexts (Altglas 2005; Altglas 2007). 
There thus arises a problem of authority: should recognitions and privileges accorded 
over many centuries to particular religious cultures and institutions, with their 
hierarchies and doctrines and authorized spokesmen, be extended to all those who 
claim recognition as religions under expanded criteria, in circumstances where the 
question who or what a religious authority is and whether such an authority merits 
any special status or regard from the state is essentially contestable? 
The weakening of religion as heritage and the concomitant proliferation of religious 
authorities is likely to continue ever faster if the recent decision of a German Court on 
circumcision (in Cologne, June 27th 2012) is to be read as a sign of things to come.  
Apart from the inevitable outcry about its implications for the practice of age-old 
traditions – Jewish, Muslim and other - which were subsequently rectified by 
 legislation on December 12th 2012, the ruling focused on the rights of parents to 
transmit their religious affiliation to their children. In the view of the court, the 
‘permanent and irreparable’ change wrought by circumcision ‘runs counter to the 
interests of the child, who can decide his religious affiliation himself later in life’. If 
this principle is upheld and extended, then the entire basis of Europe’s religious 
regime is threatened, because all family religious rituals can be regarded as pre-
empting the child’s religious affiliation. The instance is also curious because whereas 
religion is usually regarded as enjoying very special exemptions and privileges with 
respect to the law, here it is being singled out as the one type of affiliation which 
parents should not impose on their children, whereas the ‘imposition’, for example, of 
language, ethnic identity, or diet, is presumably  permissible.  
The consequences of individual-based and therefore almost arbitrary criteria of 
religious belonging which operate in the United States, are vividly described by 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s documentation of a week in the life of a Florida court, 
observing a case in which certain citizens in Boca Raton, Florida, argued that by not 
allowing them to embellish their loved ones’ tombstones in a municipal cemetery as 
they wished, the municipality was violating their religious rights (Sullivan 2005). Her 
account shows that the provisions of the First Amendment (non-establishment and 
free exercise) have been far from enough to keep religion and government from 
arguing ad infinitum. Rather, we observe an open-ended (but often ill-tempered) 
negotiation between commonsense versions of religion and judicial attempts to 
resolve formally thorny and often trivial disputes. Put another way, zealous 
individuals, sometimes backed by organized campaigns (though not in the Boca 
Raton case), invest in the judicial process to make their point. But note that in Latin 
America, where all states proclaim their ‘laïc’ (or ‘laico’) character, but where the 
litigation culture is different, such disputes are largely unknown in the legal sphere. 
The idea, though, that any contemporary regime of religious regulation has drawn 
crystal-clear lines around the religious sphere is highly questionable.  
 
Drawing lines and blurring them 
In France the delineation of religious and secular spheres under the regime of laïcité is 
the outcome of a series of milestones each of which further thickened the frontier: the 
 ‘Loi Ferry’ of 1882 which established the ‘free, secular and compulsory’ principle of 
schooling, the law of 1904 which removed clergy from the ranks of teachers in state 
schools, and finally the Law of 1905 on the separation of Church and State. Under 
this law the state ceased forever, in laïcité’s classic constitutional formula, to 
‘recognize, pay the salaries of, or remunderate any religious institution.3 At the same 
time the national state became the owner of then-existing cathedrals, and the local 
authorities, the communes, took nominal ownership of then-existing parish churches, 
thus accepting responsibility for their upkeep. Yet in recent years communes, using 
spurious technical arguments, have been notoriously resistant to the construction of 
mosques, forcing Muslim worship into garages and similar precarious locations. So 
while they have a responsibility for the upkeep of myriads of parish churches they are 
able to tacitly discriminate against Muslims wanting to build places of worship, thus 
in effect violating the principle of non-recognition,
4
 and ignoring the technically 
abstract character of religion in a secular arrangement.
5
 The French state also 
subsidizes écoles sous contrat of which 95% were nominally Catholic in the early 
1990s, but with little clerical involvement in the life of the school (Héran, 1996). 
However, Jewish écoles sous contrat operate such a strictly Jewish regime that the 
inclusion of non-Jewish students is barely imaginable, so the state is in effect 
subsidizing a parochial education.
6
 For example, a 2009 newspaper report on a girls’ 
school in Paris run by the Lubavich sect certainly cast doubt on the idea that the state 
does not subsidize any religion (‘L’enseignement confessionnel fait école’ Libération, 
28 December 2009). Even so, there are fierce disagreements among Jewish currents 
of opinion and practice about whether the conditionalities attached to the contract are 
acceptable (Birnbaum 1995: 207).  
A further deviation from the image of unflinching separation is the case of the region 
of Alsace-Moselle where, in recognition of the region’s special history as part of 
Germany between the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War, and the 
patriotism of its population, the Catholic Church enjoys official recognition and the 
state pays the salaries of some pastors, priests and rabbis (but not of course mullahs or 
imams). Alsace also had at the time a significant Jewish population, among whom the 
French state found numerous loyal judges and civil and military servants, not least 
Captain Alfred Dreyfus.
7
 
 In 2004, after years of periodic trivial but over-dramatized incidents, laïcité received 
further legislative attention in the form of a law passed by 494 vs. 36 votes in the 
French National Assembly, and known as the ‘headscarf ban’, though it is not exactly 
a ban and does not apply only to headscarves. The law forbids the wearing of 
egregious religious ornaments
8
 in state schools. The passage of the law was hard to 
interpret as anything but an expression of negative sentiments by the political elite 
against the country’s Muslim population, and the practical effects have been quite 
limited: conflicts over headscarves have been rare in French schools and in 
accordance with a ruling by the Conseil d’Etat (Constitutional Court), have been 
settled locally without recourse to legal procedures, implying either that, political 
considerations apart, a law was an unnecessary diversion, or that it has had a powerful 
pre-emptive dissuasive effect. In theory the law also prohibited the wearing of the 
kippa by Jewish students, but the enforcement of that implication has hardly been 
mentioned, while representatives of the Sikhs whose turban was also caught up in the 
storm, have taken several cases to the European Court of Human Rights.  The Conseil 
d’Etat tip-toed around the issue, hesitating between the view that outward religious 
ornaments were only to be prohibited if they undermined discipline (they used the 
French word ‘troubles’) in the classroom, and another view that pupils should avoid 
any ‘marque ostentatoire’ – any ‘egregious’ symbol of their religious adherence. Both 
cases reveal a search for what might be called a ‘soft’ reinterpretation of the law 
(Birnbaum, 1995: 205, 209-10). In May 2010 the Chamber of Deputies voted 
unanimously for another law, this time prohibiting the ‘voile intégral’ or ‘full-face 
veil’ (burqa or niqab) in public spaces.9  
In a separate controversy surrounding the state’s circumscribing of religion, an earlier 
panic-driven initiative, the 2001 loi anti-sectes, directed against Scientology and other 
cults, of  remains a mere gesture which has been severely criticized by lawyers 
because, it raises issues of freedom of religion and speech, while adding nothing to 
existing provisions against kidnapping, brainwashing and the like, (Volff, 2005:113). 
In any case, that law has not given rise to effective legal action against the cults which 
sectors of opinion had branded abusers and practitioners of brainwashing (Altglas, 
2010).
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 Yet the forces of religion, or at least of the Catholic Church, are by no means 
powerless: only 20 years earlier President Mitterrand had been forced, by 
demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in support of private (overwhelmingly 
 Catholic) education, to withdraw a proposed law to integrate in a fairly loose manner 
the public and private education systems. A similar attempt to stop legalization of gay 
marriage in 2013 has not been so successful.  
 
In England (not Scotland or Wales, let alone Northern Ireland), in at least apparent 
contrast to France, the state-religion relationship has evolved in a less clear-cut way 
through a myriad of concessions and negotiations, to the point where although there is 
a quaintly described ‘established’ – i.e. official – church, and although 26 Anglican 
Archbishops and Bishops sit as of right in the House of Lords, and the state funds 
innumerable Church of England, and Catholic schools, plus a few Jewish and a tiny 
number of Muslim ones
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, constitutional practice is highly secularized, with zero 
government funding of religious buildings, worship or personnel – in contrast to the 
prevailing arrangements in many Northern European countries, France and some 
Swiss cantons. In theory the English arrangements operate so as to prevent charities 
and schools from promoting or excluding one or another faith, although in state-
funded Jewish schools the pupils are mostly Jewish, and like in France pupils and 
schools have become steadily more Orthodox in recent decades. Church of England 
and Catholic schools often attract children from religiously unaffiliated families and 
in predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods sometimes have a majority of Muslim 
children. Yet this is the same state in whose province of Northern Ireland there are 
institutionalized separations between Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist 
electorates, whose neighbourhoods do not share social services and whose children 
overwhelmingly attend separate schools.  
In an admittedly polemical book by Marci Hamilton which documents innumerable 
cases of religious prerogatives granted by the Federal and especially state 
governments in the US notably on taxation issues, in apparent contravention of the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution (Hamilton, 2005). The higher courts 
continue to duck and weave around these issues so as to avoid creating precedents on 
anything too religiously controversial. Both journalistic and academic accounts note 
that the law has fluctuated on these subjects, reflecting political pressures, and that the 
1970s marked a high point in judicial assertion of separation: since then, they tell us, 
the claims of religious organizations have been well received by politicians concerned 
 with the vote and also by the courts. Inherited legislation was presumably based on an 
assumption that services provided by institutions such as the Holy Cross Brothers 
would cater to the poor and destitute, but that is not necessarily the case any more, nor 
can the courts take account of such social impacts in deciding on their religious 
character.
12
  
Judges in the US also seem unwilling to clearly delineate persons whose ministry 
constitutes ‘a core expression of religious belief’ and who therefore are entitled to tax 
exemptions, for this might involve distinguishing between a priest and, say, a nurse 
employed by a religiously sponsored or managed institution. And one can understand 
why: is it for the courts to decide how such core roles could be distinguished? Could 
they seriously require some sort of criterion like a ritual of induction? Once the 
underlying inherited  assumptions – consensual or not, but assumed to be such – about 
religious belonging and belief have been relativized, once they are no longer taken as 
self-evident and made subject to legal-rational inspection, the issue becomes not just 
uncertain and contentious, but also politicized, because of the competitiveness and 
ambition of religious organizations and entrepreneurs and the political constituencies 
they can influence. So as the state, in the person of judges, recoils from defining what 
counts as religious, on the grounds that to do so would be to violate the fourteenth 
amendment provision of free exercise and non-establishment, religious groups find 
more and more exemptions and protections within the state.  
Ancient understandings become arms in new struggles  
This politicization is not a matter of ideological and policy-related pronouncements 
by religious organizations, which are a standard feature of any remotely democratic 
state-religion regime. Rather it is about the destabilization of ancient implicit 
European understandings originating in a set of largely forgotten cultural 
assumptions, which retain their legitimacy in the name of new ways of being religious 
and of being a religion. The new ways are firstly a shift in the shared understanding of 
what counts as legitimate religious authority: the idea that religious authority lies with 
professionals in a hierarchy committed, for example, to celibacy, the renunciation of 
worldly possessions, the wearing of distinctive dress, or a devotion to a life of 
learning, sacrifice, and charity, and secondly, following from this shift away from 
hierarchical authority, the mobilization of personal belief as sufficient authority to 
 claim the same state recognition and the same exemptions once accorded to 
recognized and recognizable church hierarchies. This gives rise to frequent disputes. 
For example, the ideals of free exercise and non-establishment were developed in a 
world in which birth, marriage and death were a matter for religious authorities and 
the state had no involvement in people’s reproductive behaviour, or in medical 
treatment in extreme old age, not to speak of the certification of same-sex marriages. 
Such issues have fuelled demands for special recognition of the religious for example 
from officials refusing to certify same-sex marriages or pressures for the state to fund 
religious schools operating a regime of strict observance. These concessions could 
almost amount to a separate category of citizenship under which religious affiliation 
exempts individuals and organizations from universal rules which in most democratic 
regimes are supposed to apply irrespective of ‘race, religion or creed’: as these 
demands are met so religion becomes a benefit or entitlement for followers, rather 
than a burden or sacrifice by people (monks, pastors etc.) whom society as a whole 
should subsidize, and difficult questions arise as to whether respect for religious 
freedom and for its benefits to society take precedence over other policies, for 
example to protect children’s rights, or to protect parents’ rights (as in anti-cult 
controversies). Thus we have to find a line not only between the state and religion, but 
also between freedom of expression and religious privilege, so that we can explain 
and justify why religious freedom requires privileged treatment additional to freedom 
of expression. This search is compounded by polarized factions and tendencies within 
religious groups, making it difficult for states to find legitimate negotiating partners 
(‘interlocuteurs valables’).  
These conflicts could be described as the less visible, even dark, side of the ‘vicarious 
religion’, which Grace Davie sees as a salient feature of contemporary European 
societies. Davie describes a type of free riding where religion is ‘performed by an 
active minority but on behalf of a much larger number who (implicitly at least) not 
only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the minority is doing’ (Davie 
2006: 22). (This is not the same as the relationship between the faithful and the world-
renouncing virtuosi described below and drawn from Danièle Hervieu-Léger, for that 
is a quasi-magical relationship binding followers to a church, not the same as a bland 
recognition of the value of religion in general.) Davie states that her idea is based on 
the religious ‘middle ground’ of broad but passive support for mainstream religions 
 like the Church of England or the established state-funded churches of Northern 
Europe and Scandinavia, and my notion of religion as heritage is much the same as 
hers. The present analysis then complements her idea by shifting the focus away from 
people’s feelings and beliefs to the institutional and political implications of this state 
of affairs, deploying ‘belief’ in the context of claims-making or the  justification of 
religion, not with reference to what individuals might ‘actually’ believe or feel. Its 
argument is that with vicarious religion comes a corollary - the destabilizing force of 
some versions of evangelical and charismatic Christianity, of fundamentalisms of 
various kinds, of the transplantation of religious habits by immigration and by the 
search for supernatural inspiration or alleviation, and so on, with serious implications 
for regimes of religious regulation. 
 
Religion as an inclusive or exclusive good? 
The discussion also has to go beyond the questions of religious freedom and 
exemption, to ask whether religious organizations which practice exclusiveness and 
have no visible or answerable authority beyond a local manager (i.e. pastor) can claim 
the same exemptions as those which are more institutionalized. It is worth reminding 
ourselves that those forms of Christian religion which benefit from state bias embody 
a religiosity open to more or less everyone, provide parish churches serving every 
square kilometre of a given national territory, and are neither demanding nor 
exclusive, and hence fit well with vicarious religion. This contrasts with today’s most 
rapidly growing Christian tendency, the evangelical churches, which in principle 
require their followers to pay a regular tithe of one tenth their pre-tax income. 
Sometimes openness is reflected in formal arrangements: for example, in England the 
established Church, and in Wales the disestablished Church, are obliged, subject to 
minor exceptions, to marry anyone who asks to be married by a priest – a centuries-
old provision which has recently come under the spotlight because of the UK 
coalition government’s announced intention to legislate for same-sex marriages. But 
the openness which matters is in the domain of symbols and public rituals: churches 
open to all comers, located in salient places as symbols of a city’s standing or pride, 
or a village’s shared sense of belonging, providing priests as community mediators, 
 bishops to crown kings, and chaplains to minister to students, prisoners and soldiers, 
often as counsellors yet deriving their trust from their religious-pastoral office.  
No wonder then that Ernest Gellner, who described himself variously as an atheist and 
an ‘Enlightenment fundamentalist’, argued in favour of what he called ‘Constitutional 
Religion’, on an analogy with constitutional monarchy: ‘part of a cultural Broad 
Church’ which embraces the ‘legitimation of social arrangements’ like religious 
marriage as well as non-religious activities like ‘serious cognition’ (i.e. scientific 
rationality), allowing individuals to ‘locate themselves at will’ along that spectrum 
(Gellner, 1992: 91-92). In the same vein, Chris Hann (2000) raises a serious question 
whether one can justify untrammelled opening up of religious regulation without 
regard for the institutionalization and accountability of the organizations thus 
benefited. Questioning the benefits to civility brought by opening up the religious 
field in Eastern Europe’s postsocialist countries, Hann argues that ‘the retention of a 
“lukewarm” faith offers the best chances for tolerance and freedom. In several of 
these countries the religious field has been opened to competition in response to 
‘international religious human rights-ism’ promoted by ‘well-funded transnational 
pressure groups’ which have built alliances with the most conservative elements in the 
national churches (Hann, 2000; Hann, 2006), leading to bitter controversies over 
women’s reproductive rights, predictably, but also little enhancement of freedom – 
accompanied by tacit acquiescence in attitudes to Jews and actions against Gypsies, 
which, to say the least, inspire a legitimate fear for their freedom and even their 
safety, and hardly enhance human rights.  
Hann is here making a discrete argument against the rapid adoption of secularism or 
of an unrestricted ‘religious market’ in countries where the field was previously 
dominated by a national church or ‘confessionalist’ regime (Koenig, forthcoming) 
because the sudden shift can tear apart the social fabric. The point about politicization 
can also be formulated in terms of Daniéle Hervieu-Léger’s emphasis on the openness 
and inclusiveness of a Church which, being charged with the redemption of all 
mankind, distinguished between the strict observance and personal sacrifice required 
of its virtuosi, and the minimal observance asked of its followers (Hervieu-Léger, 
2001: 141), in contrast to conversion-led movements which demand heavy sacrifice 
from all followers. Sects, unlike national churches, are distinguished by their inward-
looking focus and the intense personal commitment required of their members. But 
 one can go further, and ask whether the absence of even a nominally national Church 
is not a factor behind the political involvement of churches in the US, which in recent 
history has ranged from the civil rights movement to the Tea Party and the current 
culture wars, described by Putnam and Campbell (2010) as the bitterest ideological 
battles that country has ever seen.  
It was not always so divisive, for churches have been a central element in civic life in 
American townships ever since Tocqueville, as can be seen from  Robert Wuthnow’s 
recent religious history of Kansas (Wuthnow 2012), which describes in engrossing 
detail the centrality of churches in the civic life of small towns. But more recently 
religious leadership, which until Prohibition in rural Kansas tended to be a force for 
political consensus, has tended to encourage polarization at national and local level 
(culminating in Kansas in the murder, in the doorway of his church in May 2009, of a 
doctor who ran an abortion clinic).  
 
The polarization appears to be related to the openness of the religious market and 
invites two observations. One is that where there is a history of hegemony or 
establishment there are fairly stable institutional arrangements for the management of 
the interaction between the state and religious bodies, such as the French schooling 
arrangements we have mentioned (absent in the US). These arrangements may not be 
strictly compliant with a demanding interpretation of separation, and they are also 
very likely to be biased against minority religions, but in the European countries 
where they prevail there has hitherto, in the 20
th
 century, been a degree of tolerance 
for that, and a (still) limited pressure for judicial intervention in drawing detailed 
definitions and frontiers – an ultimately impossible task for judicial reasoning, as the 
contrasting interpretations of the ECHR by Edmunds and Koenig illustrate (Edmunds, 
2012; Koenig, forthcoming). The second is that where there are elaborate and 
longstanding institutional arrangements for a Church both to govern itself and to deal 
with the state there may be less tension over religious exemptions and prerogatives, 
and, despite establishment as in England,  the state may in fact be more laïc
13
 than in 
the US because there are established consensus-based mechanisms to prevent 
unwarranted interference, and areas of competence are clearly demarcated. Note again 
that the issue is not the intervention of religious leaders and organizations in public 
political debate or their influence on the electorate, but rather the stability and 
 legitimacy of a consensus about the rules and traditions governing the interaction 
between religious and state institutions. Even so, the arrangements are eroded by new 
understandings of religion already mentioned, and by internal divisions within 
religious communities over the proper role of the state. 
In that respect this argument diverges from the (implicit but rarely enunciated) 
assumption underlying the economics of religion school, in the writings of Rodney 
Stark and his associates, that the less regulated a regime of state-religion relations the 
better not only for religious organizations but also for society as a whole. In this 
perspective, religion need only justify its benefit to its own followers, not to society as 
a whole, so that the inclusiveness of a church is not a value (Iannaccone, 1994; 
Iannacone, 1997; Stark, 1997; Stark and Finke, 2000; Lehmann, 2010).  The 
implication also is that, pace Grace Davie’s earlier account of Europe (2002), one way 
or another all countries are exceptions, but  the US is an outlier, an exception among  
exceptions which diverges more from all the others than any other in Europe or the 
Americas. 
A good illustration is provided by the Church of England, bearer of a national and 
open religious tradition, which now, in a time of declining Christian religious 
observance, and proliferating religious affiliations, all seeking recognition, finds itself 
in the role of guardian of the idea and legitimacy of religion in general – any religion. 
The liberal voice, even if it is drowned out occasionally by an ‘evangelical wing’, 
goes beyond managing the vicarious enjoyments of a Christian religion, and finds 
itself entrusted with managing multi-faith coexistence, being considered implicitly 
and institutionally as ‘above the fray’. In the fascinating and sometimes amusing 
description of religious provision in English prisons by Beckford and Gilliatt (1998), 
for example, Church of England officiants tried to ‘create opportunities for sharing 
“common ground” between prisoners of different faith traditions’, and tended to 
promote ‘religion in general’, leading to some almost surreal situations. And their 
ethnography is nicely complemented by a lecture given by the former Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in 2008, when, à propos of Sharia law, he defended the 
recognition by the state of ‘structures or protocols that embody the diversity of moral 
reason in a plural society by allowing scope for a minority group to administer its 
affairs according to its own convictions’ (Williams, 2008: 268). Of course the lecture 
was lambasted in the tabloid press, as advocacy of the introduction of Sharia, whereas 
 his true purpose was to insist on the need for secular arrangements precsely to protect 
people within minority communities from the violation of their universal rights, by 
bringing Sharia under the protective umbrella of the legal system (Williams, 2008: 
271-2). The Archbishop, like the prison chaplains, was giving voice to a liberal 
secularist, but obviously far from atheistic, mindset: religion at the service of society 
and the world (which is not reducible to charitable giving).  
 
Conversion-led movements and the secularization of religious reason 
The dynamic forces in religion as option or preference are conversion-led movements. 
I use this term so as to encompass all sorts of movements in Christianity, Judaism and 
Islam which are commonly labelled fundamentalist, charismatic or evangelical, but 
have this one factor in common: their followers describe their adherence in terms of a 
life-changing conversion experience. The notion of ‘conversion-led’ overcomes the 
difference between traditions and offers a more analytical or generic description of 
them as a social phenomenon, avoiding a theological characterization while 
encompassing both charismatics and certain types of fundamentalist. The success of 
these movements challenges the idea of religion as heritage, as ‘imbibed with 
mother’s milk’ and reinforces that of religion as an option or life choice, so they do 
not depart radically from vicarious religion Among Muslims and Jews it takes the 
form, generally, of religious renewal, return or reversion – in short a ‘return’ (as Jews 
call it) to strict observance by people who have been brought up with little or no 
religious observance. (Metcalf, 1996; Lehmann and Siebzehner, 2006).  Among 
Christians, millions have adopted Pentecostalism (Martin, 2001; Maxwell, 2006; 
Corten and Marshall-Fratani, 2001; Freston, 2001 and many others) having previously 
been inactive Catholics or Protestants, or irreligious, or involved in possession cults 
of various kinds, so that, according to census figures, today 22.2% of almost 200 
million Brazilians belong to evangelical churches, up from 15.4% in 2000.  (The 
figure, however, includes 4% in what Americans call ‘mainline’ and Brazilians call 
‘historic’ Protestant churches, and  4.8% ‘indeterminate evangelicals’ so the 22.2% is 
an exaggeration.
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) It must be emphasised that although the Universal Church of the 
Kingdom of God and other neo-Pentecostal churches like them grab the headlines, the 
Assemblies of God which broadly speaking represent ‘classic’ Pentecostalism, still 
constitute the overwhelming majority, The religious ethos of these movements tends 
 to be inward-looking and this-worldly, encouraging followers to focus on personal 
discipline and on contributions in time and money to the movement with little 
attention to the transcendental, to theology or to religion’s contribution to society. 
Classic Pentecostalism may be austere and humble storefront chapels may be its trade 
mark, but it does not invoke the transcendental in the sense in which, for example, 
Charles Taylor understands the word. While Taylor’s emphasis is on ‘the sense that 
there is some good higher than, beyond human flourishing’ (Taylor 2007: 20), 
Pentecostalism, and especially neo-Pentecostalism, focuses precisely on human 
flourishing, success and wellbeing, and on a supernatural which is not at all the same 
as Taylor’s higher good. Their supernatural, especially among neo-Pentecostals, is 
either a possessive force outside the self which prevents or even poisons the 
realization of an individual’s potential, or the help of Jesus in achieving that human 
flourishing and personal empowerment, by a leap of self-belief. Of course, ideas 
about other-worldly salvation are recognized, but receive little mention.  
Neo-Pentecostalism has taken up the themes of conversion and healing and speaking 
in tongues and combined it with a cult of the spectacular and of worldly success, and 
with a choreography of life as a drama in which the individual faces constant threats 
from the forces of evil (Birman 2007). The model developed by the neo-Pentecostal 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, founded in Brazil in 1979, has spawned 
many imitators in Brazil and in Africa, with extensions in Europe, and seems to be the 
most dynamic such force in world Pentecostalism, characterized by large-scale 
centralized churches with a global, multinational reach. Neo-Pentecostal churches 
make insistent demands for donations during religious services, and proclaim the 
promise of worldly success, often as embodied in the prosperity exhibited by their 
leaders (Lehmann 1996; Comaroff, 2009; Marshall, 2009). Neo-Pentecostal preaching 
consists of summary morale-boosting exhortations, accompanied by exemplary real-
life histories of triumph over adversity and material success (Campos, 1997). Heaven 
and indeed hell are here on earth, and the Churches offer a cure for the afflictions of 
the world more than a refuge from them. The task of the Church is not primarily to 
heal the world but to empower individuals. Procedures and symbols are adopted and 
abandoned with little regard for a ‘system’ or ‘tradition’ and artefacts and symbols are 
borrowed and then culled like seasonal decorations, as illustrated by the adoption of 
Jewish or quasi-Jewish paraphernalia by the Universal Church and others. It is an 
 untrammelled type of religious enterprise which recognizes few external constraints 
on the claims it can make in the name of religion and grates against European 
traditions of religious regulation. The model pioneered by this organization has made 
it into a vast global operation and has also been successfully adopted by many others.  
Political involvement of conversion-led movements 
On the whole, Pentecostals in Latin America have not posed serious problems for 
regimes of religious regulation: their involvement in politics is largely of a corporatist 
kind, seeking office and resources, and they do not adopt the kind of political-
religious rhetoric that is heard in the United States, whether on the left, as in the civil 
rights movement, or associated with fundamentalist Christianity and linked to issues 
such as civil rights, social policy, taxation and government expenditure (Fonseca, 
2008; Freston, 2008; Gomes 2011; Machado, 2006). Classic Pentecostals are as 
hostile to abortion and same-sex marriage as the Catholic hierarchy, but in Brazil the 
Universal Church’s leader has taken a mainstream liberal position on the subject 
(Duarte et al., 2009: 54). The Brazilian Congress has an evangelical caucus of about 
63 Deputies and 3 Senators and two political parties. This involvement in politics is 
not an issue for laicidad(e), because they do not demand the sorts of prerogatives 
which the Catholic Church has had in the past in some Latin countries. Several court 
cases against Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches in Brazil have concerned 
misappropriation of church funds (see for example Isto E, 9 September 2011) and 
harassment of Afro-Brazilian religions and slandering of their officiants – whom the 
Universal Church has on one occasion been obliged to compensate. No important case 
has concerned their status as religious organizations. Since the 1990s religious 
associations are recognized separately from associations in general, which exempts 
them from tax but not from the obligation to supply tax returns (Giumbelli, 2008), 
something from which the Catholic Church is exempt under a 2008 Concordat. This 
results in something of a free-for-all in which the title of ‘religion’ is hard to withhold 
from any organization. It is therefore disquieting that the selfsame Universal Church 
is said to use its followers’ contributions to subsidize TV Record, owned by its leader 
Edir Macedo, by overpaying for air time occupied by night-long religious 
programmes. Recently the issue was highlighted by the Folha de São Paulo (February 
20, 2013): à propos of a surge in church income, which has now reached the 
equivalent of US$10 billion in one year
15
, the newspaper said the state has no way of 
 dealing with ‘business-religions’ whose leaders own private jets, mansions, publishing 
houses and TV networks.
16
  On the other hand, there are also indications that the tax 
authorities are keeping up or that the Universal Church does take care to keep its 
affairs in order: a current (2013) court case concerning the taxing of the millions of 
dollars’ worth of stone it has imported from Israel to build the façade of its 
monumental ‘Temple of Solomon’ in São Paulo revolves around the issue of whether 
the stone is essential to the Church’s religious functioning and exempt on those 
grounds.
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Conversely, there has been little if any human-rights-based litigation in Brazil such as 
we have seen in Europe around religious discrimination, school uniforms, 
headscarves or the like: most Latin American countries, seem to live peaceably with a 
fuzzy arrangement in which the law is not brought into such issues. In Brazil, 
specifically, there is also the additional meaning of heritage because the possession 
cults are a shared national heritage, another open religion in the terms enunciated 
above, to which many Brazilians, usually at least nominal Catholics, can have 
recourse when they feel the need. Even the cult of Santo-Daime, whose adepts 
regularly take the dangerous drug ayahuasca, are exempt from repressive measures, 
presumably because of their popularly recognized religious status. So on the one hand 
there are few barriers to religious status, but on the other hand there are few 
exemptions and privileges except for the major issue of tax, and, so far, there is little 
mobilization of religion in the name of non-religious issues.  
But this sanguine evaluation of the state of play in Brazil may underestimate  changes 
in the relationship between religion and the state. The polemics over same-sex 
marriage and abortion, have recently become very shrill and even bitter: in March 
2013 there was uproar against the appointment of Marco Feliciano, a Pentecostal 
pastor and vociferous opponent of homosexuality, as President of the Congressional 
Human Rights Commission. But he defended himself uncompromisingly, and such 
moments may herald a new turn in these matters. Having been appointed as part of an 
intricate inter-party division of such posts, Feliciano remained. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 If, in this three way comparison, the true outlier is the United States, this is  because it 
has no history of a national or hegemonic church, which all European and Latin 
American countries do have, and because in the twentieth century religion has played 
such a prominent role in social conflicts in that country, and today plays a uniquely 
prominent and polarizing role in its politics. The implication is that there is no single 
model of a secular order, and there are many models of state-religion relations. To 
encompass them what is needed is a concept of secularism as a regime of state-
religion relations. regime being defined as ‘a set of ‘implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area’ (Krasner, 1982: 185) – and in which impersonally 
adjudicated rules govern the relations between state ands religion. 
 
But while the regimes vary so much, the conversion-led movements, as products or at 
least correlates of globalization, have numerous features in common across the world.   
They are by no means majority movements, but their impact has been far out of 
proportion to their numbers because within the religious field they are much more 
dynamic, and their followers more committed than other tendencies which conceive 
religious adherence differently. Indeed, one central argument is that regimes of state-
religion relations have great difficulty dealing with religious movements and sub-
cultures which demand high levels of commitment from their followers, because their 
institutions – whatever their origin – have been adapted to deal with low-intensity 
religion in which clergy do the hard work and the followers follow. Liberal secularists 
must now take these phenomena seriously and develop ways of including them, just 
as the Archbishop wanted to include Sharia, rather than dismissing them as mad, 
irrational or ignorant. 
 
Notes 
1. The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life published survey results in October 
2012 showing a slow but steady growth of the ‘religiously unaffiliated’ in the US 
from 15.3% in 2007 to 19.6% in 2012. The distribution was heavily skewed by 
age, and the report was careful to note nevertheless that 68% of the religiously 
unaffiliated ‘believe in God’. www.pewforum.org  
2. *See her lecture at the conference on new Forms of Public Religion at St John’s 
College, Cambridge, September 2012, and her unpublished paper ‘ Strategic and 
Tactical Religion (May 2012). 
 3. ‘La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte.’ 
4. This is what might be called ‘negative recognition’. 
5. The Swiss are more straightforward. After a referendum in 2009 their Constitution 
now contains the phrase: ‘La construction de minarets est interdite.’ 
6. As is the case in England for the strictly Orthodox ‘Beit Yakov’ girls’ schools in 
London and Manchester, where a similar arrangement allows the state to pay for 
the secular curriculum but not religious learning. 
7. Hence the classic phrase ‘les juifs fous de la République’ – ‘Jews madly in love 
with the Republic’. 
8. The exact text prohibits the following: ‘le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les 
élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse’. 
9. The penalty is symbolic: €150 or a citizenship course. The penalty for inciting 
someone to wear it is much heavier: €30,000. The number of women wearing a 
burqa at the time was derisory, but of course has risen since. 
10. The intimidatingly named MIVILUDES (Mission interministérielle de vigilance 
et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires) the non-statutory body established in the 
wake of the law to monitor and fight against the spread of sectarian patterns of 
behaviour, makes a point on the opening page of its website, of stating that its task 
is not to define a sect nor to keep a list of sects, but rather to keep abreast of the 
‘dérives sectaires’. The list of these patterns makes it clear that what in French is 
called ‘sectes’ would be best rendered in English by ‘cult’. 
http://www.miviludes.gouv.fr/missions/principes-daction 
11. The Church of England website states that there are 4,800 CofE state-funded 
schools, and the Catholic Education Service says it has 2,000. Numbers are not 
easily available for state-funded Jewish or Muslim schools.  
12. On October 6,7 and 8 2008 the New York Times ran a series of articles under the 
title ‘In God’s Name’ documenting extensive tax breaks, immunity from 
employment legislation, immunity from safety legislation and the like for not just 
places of worship but for all sorts of businesses and facilities run by religious 
communities like day-care centers, retirement homes, and universities. 
13. I use laïc in the place of ‘secular’ because it refers specifically to the lines of 
demarcation and the institutions which exist to manage those lines.  
14. The terms in Portuguese are ‘evangélicos’, divided into those ‘de origem 
Pentecostal’, ‘evangelicos de missão’ and ‘evangélicos não determinados’. The 
use of the term ‘de missão’ derives from the identification of historic Protestant 
churches with immigrant groups from Europe in the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, 
who received or brought missionary families with them.  
15. This information is available because although they are tax exempt, churches and 
other religious bodies  (except the Catholic Church) must present accounts to the 
tax authorities. No doubt vast amounts remain undeclared, especially of cash 
donations.  
16. The leader of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, for example, is said 
by Forbes to be worth almost one billion dollars, and among the next five 
wealthiest pastors are  two former associates of his whose worth is in the hundreds 
of millions. See www.forbes.com 17 January 2013. 
17. See ‘As pedras no caminho da Universal’, Veja (São Paulo), 13 March 2013. and 
http://www.otemplodesalomao.com 
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